In this work, the authors propose a phenomenological approach to the study of confusional states. First, they define consciousness as a state of wakefulness, characterised by assimilation and awareness of one's normal experiences and by a feeling of one's own identity. As far as consciousness disorders are concerned, they first consider confusional-dreaming states and then states of restricted consciousness. In the former, they identify a loss of the objective perspective of the self-world relationship, which, in the experience of the subject in a confusional-dreaming state, leads to an alteration of the background-foreground ratio that characterises the life of consciousness; the perceptual and the representational fluxes intermingle, leaving the subject unable to distinguish one from the other: what is real becomes imaginary and what is imaginary becomes real in a world in which only subjective meanings matter. The experience of a subject in a state of restricted consciousness is also peculiar: the experience of consciousness is not lost, but it appears to consciousness itself as limited, as it retains an intentional relationship with this world; therefore what occurs, within the range of the phenomena perceived by the subject, is an absolute dominance of the shape, standing out against the background; a limited number of representations prevail and the patient cannot switch from these to others of his own volition.
|Translated title of the contribution||A phenomenological approach to the study of confusional states|
|Number of pages||7|
|Publication status||Published - 2006|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Clinical Neurology