Optimal vaccination choice, vaccination games, and rational exemption: An appraisal

Piero Manfredi, Pompeo Della Posta, Alberto d'Onofrio, Ernesto Salinelli, Francesca Centrone, Claudia Meo, Piero Poletti

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

40 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A threat for vaccination policies might be the onset of "rational" exemption, i.e. the family's decision not to vaccinate children after a seemingly rational comparison between the perceived risk of infection and the perceived risk of vaccine side effects. We study the implications of rational exemption by models of vaccination choice. By a simple model of individual choice we first prove the "elimination impossible" result in presence of informed families, i.e. aware of herd immunity, and suggest that limited information might explain patterns of universal vaccination. Next, we investigate vaccination choice in a game-theoretic framework for communities stratified into two groups, "pro" and "anti" vaccinators, having widely different perceived costs of infection and of vaccine side effects. We show that under informed families neither a Nash nor a Stackelberg behaviour (characterized, respectively, by players acting simultaneously and by an asymmetric situation with a "leader" and a "follower) allow elimination, unless "pro-vaccinators" assign no costs to vaccine side effects. Elimination turns out to be possible when cooperation is encouraged by a social planner, provided, however, he incorporates in the "social loss function" the preferences of anti-vaccinators only. This allows an interpretation of the current Italian vaccination policy.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)98-109
Number of pages12
JournalVaccine
Volume28
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 10 2009

Fingerprint

Vaccination
vaccination
risk perception
Vaccines
adverse effects
vaccines
Herd Immunity
Costs and Cost Analysis
Infection
infection

Keywords

  • Rational exemption
  • Social planning
  • Strategic behaviour
  • Vaccination choice

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Immunology and Microbiology(all)
  • Infectious Diseases
  • Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health
  • veterinary(all)
  • Molecular Medicine

Cite this

Manfredi, P., Posta, P. D., d'Onofrio, A., Salinelli, E., Centrone, F., Meo, C., & Poletti, P. (2009). Optimal vaccination choice, vaccination games, and rational exemption: An appraisal. Vaccine, 28(1), 98-109. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2009.09.109

Optimal vaccination choice, vaccination games, and rational exemption : An appraisal. / Manfredi, Piero; Posta, Pompeo Della; d'Onofrio, Alberto; Salinelli, Ernesto; Centrone, Francesca; Meo, Claudia; Poletti, Piero.

In: Vaccine, Vol. 28, No. 1, 10.12.2009, p. 98-109.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Manfredi, P, Posta, PD, d'Onofrio, A, Salinelli, E, Centrone, F, Meo, C & Poletti, P 2009, 'Optimal vaccination choice, vaccination games, and rational exemption: An appraisal', Vaccine, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 98-109. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2009.09.109
Manfredi P, Posta PD, d'Onofrio A, Salinelli E, Centrone F, Meo C et al. Optimal vaccination choice, vaccination games, and rational exemption: An appraisal. Vaccine. 2009 Dec 10;28(1):98-109. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2009.09.109
Manfredi, Piero ; Posta, Pompeo Della ; d'Onofrio, Alberto ; Salinelli, Ernesto ; Centrone, Francesca ; Meo, Claudia ; Poletti, Piero. / Optimal vaccination choice, vaccination games, and rational exemption : An appraisal. In: Vaccine. 2009 ; Vol. 28, No. 1. pp. 98-109.
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